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The paper contrasts Lipset’s modernization hypothesis and 
Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis that entries into democracy are 
random with respect to income. We use data on income and 
democracy going back to 1820, multiple definitions of democracy, 
and non-parametric testing focusing on the distribution of entrants’ 
incomes. We find that income matters for entry into higher levels of 
democracy; but if we control for the previously achieved level of 
democracy, the income effect vanishes. This means that countries 
that enter into higher levels of democracy are not a random draw 
from the universe of all country incomes but are a random draw 
from the joint distribution of previous level of democracy and  
income. These results are compatible with the presence of a 
subgroup of (low) income and (low) democracy countries from 
which recruitment into democracy is seldom made. But for other 
countries, accession to higher levels of democracy is income-
random. Income seems therefore both to matter (probably 
explaining why poor countries cannot improve their democracy 
levels) and not matter (explaining why for other countries 
improvements in democracy are income-random).  
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1. The objective 
 
The objective of this paper is to empirically assess the validity of 
the Przeworski and Limongi hypothesis (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 
1997; Przeworski 2004) according to which entries into democracy are 
determined by non-economic factors and hence random with respect to 
level of development. This hypothesis is set in explicit opposition to the 
standard Lipset hypothesis, formulated in the 1950s (Lipset, 1959, 1960), 
according to which increased income associated with rising educational 
attainment and growing share of the middle class “naturally” leads to 
demand for democracy. Thus, income to largely “causes” the emergence 
of democracy. We test the two hypotheses using the two large and 
recently created databases which more or less cover the period from 
1820 to 2000. They are Angus Maddison’s (2004) series on economic 
growth and population and PolityIV data  on democracy. We are thus able 
to test the two hypotheses using very rich data on income and democracy 
covering the entire period of modern history. The advantage of extending 
the period back in time is that both income and democracy variability was 
less then. If the sample starts in 1950 or 1960, there is a bias, noted by 
Boix and Stokes (2003, p. 10) that poor countries are overwhelmingly 
dictatorships and rich countries democracies: an empirical approach must 
account for that systematic difference and not assume it away. 
 
We are employing mostly non-parametric techniques which, in this 
context, have not been used before. We are also concerned only with the 
narrow issue  regarding entries into democracy and level of income, not  3  
with a more complicated one of whether better performing or richer 
economies are able to sustain democracy longer. 
2 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
discussion of the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis and reviews empirical 
evidence. Section 3 describes the data and gives descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 is the core of the paper: it empirically tests the hypotheses. The 
last section presents the conclusions. 
 
2. A short discussion of the Lipset and Przeworski-Limongi hypotheses 
 
According to the well-known Lipset’s modernization theory 
increasing average income implies a more sizable and more educated 
middle class which tends to demand greater political rights thus ultimately 
leading to the emergence of democracy. In this view of the world, rising 
income or development is causally linked with political democracy. The 
experiences of Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, Greece and more 
recently Eastern Europe and the USSR lend plausibility to this view. The 
Lipset hypothesis implies what  we may call “a substantive endogeneity” 
between income and democracy. 
3 
 
                                                 
2 The Lipset hypothesis as formulated by O’Donnell (1973) and by Przeworski (2004, p. 
492) implies two distinct statements: first, democracies are more likely to survive in rich 
countries, and second, as countries get richer they are likely to evolve into democracies. 
The first statement is, according to Przeworski, true, the second  false. In this paper, we 
are interested in the second statement only.  
 
3 Boix and Stokes (2003) who extend Lipset’s theory call it a theory of “endogenous 
democratization”.  
  4  
An alternative theory is formulated by Przeworski and Limongi 
(1997). Przeworski and Limongi hold that emergence of democracy 
responds to non-economic factors but that democracies are more durable 
at high income levels.
4 If the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis were true, 
we would tend to observe in the data a greater prevalence of democracies 
among rich countries but there would be no substantive “endogeneity” 
between income and democracy but merely a “statistical” association, or 
as Przeworski and Limongi call it, the relationship between the two would 
be “exogenous.”. Clearly, the two hypotheses imply two very different 
views of the world and role of development in fostering democracy: 
democracy is either contingent on non-economic factors or is a product of 
development. 
 
Barro (1996) does one of the early econometric testings of the 
Lipset hypothesis and concludes that “propensity for democracy rises with 
per capita GDP.” Barro’s approach consists in running a democracy 
regression with the right-hand side variables that include two lagged 
democracy values (five- and ten-year lags) and a number of control 
variables, the most important of which is income. The idea is that the level 
of democracy gradually converges to the level implied by the control 
variables. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the income 
variable is interpreted to mean that there is the predicted causality 
running from income to democracy. Barro’s data are five-year averages 
                                                 
4 “We would…expect democracies to appear randomly with regard to development, but to 
die in poorer  countries and survive in wealthier ones.” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997. 
p. 157). Democracy appears in response to political contingencies. Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) conclude: “The emergence of democracy is not a by product of economic 
development. Democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals, 
and it can be initiated at any level of development.” 
  5  
that cover the period 1965-1995. Democracy is a continuous variable 
based on  Gastil’s index while GDI per capita data are from Penn World 
Tables version 5.6.  There is no instrumental variable approach so the 
possible reverse causality from democracy to income is not addressed.  
 
More recently, Przeworski and Limongi (1997), and Boix and Stokes 
(2003) have tested the two hypotheses. Consider first the time periods 
and the data they use. This is important because in the empirical work 
such as this, the data play a key role. Przeworski and Limongi use the 
data from 135 countries covering roughly  the period 1950 to 1990, Boix 
and Stokes study the period 1850-1990. For democracy (or its reverse), 
each set of authors use their own dichotomous (0-1) definition.
5 The GDI 
per capita data used by Przeworski and Limongi come from Penn World 
Tables 5.6; Boix and Stokes combine PennWorldTables (no version given) 
for the period after 1950 with Maddison’s (1995) data for the period 
before 1950.
6 Both sets of authors do parametric testing of the alternative 
hypotheses. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) reject the strong formulation 
                                                 
5 Przeworski and Limongi define dictatorship as  where at least one of the following 
conditions holds: (1) executive leader is not elected, (2) legislature is not elected. (3) 
there is no more than one party, (4) even if none of the previous three rules holds, the 
regime refuses to yield power. Boix and Stokes (2003) use a Boix and Rosato (2001) 
definition of democracy which requires that elections be free and competitive, the 
executive be accountable to either citizens (in presidential systems) or to an elected 
legislature (in parliamentary systems) and  that at least 50 percent of male electorate is 
eligible to vote. 
 
6 The combination is an odd one; it is unclear why one single source (Maddison) was not 
used throughout. Even if the correlation between the two sources is high (as reported by 
the authors in footnote 10, p. 11), it does not mean that income levels for the same 
country move seamlessly between the two sources. It is also unclear how the authors 
have “adjusted” the Maddison dataset to make it “comparable with the Summers-Heston 
dataset” (p.11).  
  6  
of the Lipset hypothesis.
7 Boix and Stokes (2003), on the contrary, accept 




The current paper differs in three respects from Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) and Boix and Stokes (2003) papers. First, the time period 
covered is longer: it extends from 1820 until 2001, and the data on income 
and democracy are consistent (that is, each comes from a single source 
covering the entire period). Second, the definition of democracy is not 
dichotomous—that is, we test the two hypotheses by using different 
definitions of democracy. Third, the emphasis is on a more flexible non-
parametric testing.  
                                                 
7 Przeworski also rejects it in his 2004 article (p. 493) where GDI per capita is shown as 
statistically not significant determinant of transition probability to democracy.  
 
8 In part, this seems to be due to what Boix and Stokes (p. 12) argue is the diminishing 
marginal effect of development on democracy—namely, that while the probability of 
transition to democracy goes up with income, the rate at which this probability increases 
gets smaller with higher income.   7  
 
3. The data and some descriptive statistics 
 
This paper uses two large and recently published databases: Angus 
Maddison’s (2004) series on income, growth and population and PolityIV 
data  on democracy.  The two sets cover practically the same period. 
Maddison’s series starts in 1820 and ends in 2001.
9 PolityIV series begins 
in 1800 and ends in 2002. A country/year is our basic unit.  
 
Gross domestic income and democracy data. The Gross Domestic 
Income (GDI) per capita data are obtained from Maddison (2004) and 
cover between 5 (in the years 1821-29) and 162 countries annually for 
the period 1820-2001. The coverage is gradually expanding throughout 
the 19
th century and from around 1880, the country coverage (measured 
by the share of world population) reaches more than 2/3. In some 
benchmark years like 1890, 1900, 1913, the coverage exceeds 95 
percent.  The average population coverage for the entire period is 73 
percent. The democracy data set comes from PolityIV (version 2002). 
Polity IV provides the country scores on democracy, autocracy and a 
number of other political variables. The annual coverage  ranges from the 
minimum of 20 countries in the early 19
th century to 157 countries in 
2002. The population coverage is in all but a few years greater than 60 
percent of world population and since the 1950s it is between 90 and 100 
percent. 
10 
                                                 
9 Actually, Maddison’s data start with year AD 1 but a much denser and more reliable 
series is available from 1820 onwards.  
 
10 In a few years when the coverage dips this is owing to the wars in China (as for 
example in 1860-61) when due to the unsettled political circumstances there is no Polity 
coding.  8  
 
The merging of the two data sets is more difficult than it might 
appear at first sight. This is because the approaches of Maddison and 
Polity IV differ in an important respect. Maddison takes, with a few 
exceptions, as his starting point the currently existing countries and tries 
to trace historical per capita income on the territory of the countries as 
they currently are. Thus, for example, Maddison’s data (generally) aim to 
present GDI per capita of the populations that were living on the current 
territory of Germany or Austria or Russia regardless of the fact that these 
countries might have been larger or smaller at given historical dates. 
PolityIV data sets takes the opposite, legalistic, approach. It considers as 
its unit of analysis a “polity” (country) that is a member of the inter-state 
system  at a given point in time and within its contemporaneous borders.
 11 
This means that the information on the level of democracy in Germany in 
(say) 1930 will pertain to all territories that were part of Germany then, 
including for example the territory that is today Poland or Russia. 
Maddison’s German data for 1930, will, on the contrary, refer only to the 
income produced within what is currently German territory.  More details 
regarding the merging of the two data sets is given in Milanovic (2005).   
 
Figure 1 shows PolityIV data on democracy. Democracy is defined 
by the PolityIV variable called polity2 which is equal to the score for 
democracy minus the score for autocracy.  Since the democracy variable 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
11 Being a member of the inter-state system is defined as being accepted as an 
independent entity either through membership of international organizations like League 
of Nations or United Nations or by being recognized as an independent entity by at least 
two major powers. The Polity definitions stems from the Correlates of War project (see 
Singer and Small, 1994).  Only entities with population greater than half-million are 
included in either Polity or Correlates of War databases.  9  
ranges between 0 and +10, and autocracy likewise from 0 to +10, the 
polity2 variable varies between –10 (least democracy) to +10 (most 
democracy). After a steady increase in the democracy score up to mid-
1920’s, the average world democracy score began an equally steady 
decline in the inter-war period and then another one as various 
Communist regimes and dictatorships in the newly independent countries 
came to power after the end of World War II. However the last twenty 
years have witnessed a major upswing in democracy so that its average 
level is now higher than at the previous peak in 1922. Variability in 
democracy scores has grown  almost continuously from the 1850’s to 
1950’s but has  recently declined. In other words, country scores are now 
more similar than  they were 20 or 30 years ago.  
  10 
 
Figure 1. World mean score for democracy and mean absolute deviation of 
democracy scores 1820-2000 
 
Source: variable Polity2 from the Polity IV database. Polity2 index ranges from –10 to 
+10. The world mean level of democracy is unweighted (each country in the sample 
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4. The hypotheses re-examined 
 
  First test: entrants’ income against incomes of all potential entrants 
The key factor that should help us distinguish between the Lipset 
and Przeworski-Limongi hypotheses is the entry-income, that is the 
income at which a country becomes a democracy. Under the Lipset 
hypothesis, there would be no entry below some threshold income and 
most countries would enter at some relatively high income. Obviously 
such a sharp discontinuity is unlikely to be observed in the real world 
where country-specific elements are always present: we would however  
expect to see the incidence of entry increasing in income.  
 
If alternatively the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis is true then the 
distribution of entry-incomes should be exactly the same as the overall 
distribution of incomes in the world: if countries’ incomes are distributed 
(say) lognormally, so should be the distribution of entry incomes. To quote 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 157), “we…expect to observe 
democracies to appear randomly with regard to level of development”. 
12 
If becoming a democracy obeys non-income factors, then what country 
becomes a democracy is a random draw as far as income is concerned. 
This can be written as (1) 
) ( Pr ) | ( Pr it t it D ob y D ob =           ( 1 )  
which means that probability of entry into democracy of level i and 
at time t, conditional on income, is the same as the unconditional 
probability of entry into democracy (country subscript is omitted). 
                                                 
12 See also a very telling Figure 2 in Przeworski (2004, p. 494).   12 
 
Figure 2. GDI per capita in the year when country entered democracy 
 
Note: Entry-year of democracy defined as the first year ever that a country has 
achieved level of democracy greater than 1, 5 or 8 as measured by polity2 variable. 
 
Figure 2 gives the distribution of entry-incomes (in 1990 
international dollars
13) when polity2 value is set alternatively at 1, 5 and 8. 
14 Consider for example income of entrants if the definition of democracy 
is taken to require a polity2 value greater than 5. We note (see Annex 1) 
that there are countries like Burma, Botswana and Niger that have entered 
democracy at income level less than $PPP 500 which is barely above 
subsistence. There are also countries that have entered democracy only 
                                                 
13 These are dollars of equal purchasing power (PPP) across countries. 
 
14 The full list of entry-incomes and entry-years for polity2>5 and polity2>8 is given in 
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when their incomes reached high levels over $10,000 (Slovenia and 
Taiwan). Moreover, there are in the year 2000 several countries with GDI 
per capita in excess $PPP8,000 that have never been democracies.  The 
range of entrants’ incomes is therefore very high and this would seem to 
argue against Lipset’s hypothesis.
15 However, the high range of entrants’ 
incomes does not, by itself, invalidate the hypothesis. To see this suppose 
that in the universe of country-incomes, there are many countries with 
very low incomes and only a few with high incomes; suppose further, 
following Lipset, that income matters for entry. There would be 
proportionally many more rich countries that are democracies but that 
does not exclude the possibility that some poor countries make it too. 
What is important is whether probability of entry increases in income. But 
in order to know what is the probability of entry,  we need to know what 
is the universe of country-incomes out of which “draws” into democracy 
are made. To this we turn next. 
 
Our first  relevant universe (called universe A) is composed of all 
countries’ incomes in the years when there were entries into democracy 
(draws). For example, suppose that in years 1950, 1953, 1961, 1965 and 
1970, there was one entry each into democracy;  then the relevant 
universe A will be composed of all country-incomes existing in those five 
years (save, of course, for countries that already are democracies). In a 
further complication, entries into democracy are not uniform across  
years: in some years, we may have only one entry, in others ten. The 
spikes at the time of the “democratic revolutions” at the end of World War 
                                                 
15 The same is true for any level of polity2 variable. If democracy is defined as polity2>8, 
the range of entrants’ incomes goes from less than $PPP 600 to more than $14,000 (see 
Annex 1).  
  14 
I and in 1990-91 are easily observable in Figure 3. This is equivalent to 
having a variable number of draws in different years. Since the underlying 
country-income distributions are different in different years  we need to 
adjust for this. We do so by giving  greater weights to the underlying 
distributions in the years where there were more draws. Going back to 
our example, if the number of draws into democracy were twice as great 
in 1970 as in 1950, then the weight attached to the underlying distribution 
of countries’ incomes in 1970 must be twice as high as for 1950. As 
mentioned, from these yearly distributions we exclude countries that are 
already democracies (according to whatever the definition of democracy 
is) since draws into new democracy cannot be made from these countries. 
To conclude, the universe of country-incomes A is thus  composed of 
country-incomes in all years where there were draws into democracy 
weighted by the number of draws and adjusted downward for countries 
that already are democracies.   15 
Figure 3. Number of country-entries into democracy, 1820-2002 
(with democracy defined as polity2>5) 
Note: Entry into democracy occurs in the first year ever when country achieves polity2 
score greater than 5.  
 
Figure 4 displays the distributions of entry-incomes and the four 
corresponding  distributions of A universe when democracy is defined 
alternatively as polity2>1, polity2>3, polity2>5 and polity2>8. While for 
the lower levels of democracy (polity2>1 and polity2>3) the distributions 
of entry-incomes and universe A are fairly similar, as the level of 
democracy increases,  the distributions visually diverge from each other. 
In other words, as we increase our polity2 cut-off level,  the distribution 
of entry-incomes shifts much  more to the right than the distribution of 
the income universe and the two distributions gradually become more 
dissimilar. Indeed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which at low levels of 
democracy accepts (at 1 percent level) the hypothesis of equality of the 
two distributions, strongly rejects the hypothesis as soon as the polity2  
cut-off reaches 5 (see Table 1). Notice an almost strict monotonic 
relationship: the hypothesis of equality of the two distributions is accepted 
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year 16 
become smaller and smaller so much that for the two highest democracy 
levels, the hypothesis is easily rejected at far less than 1 percent level.  
 
This result is confirmed by the parametric tests of the means (Table 
1). Again, as the definition of democracy becomes more demanding,  the 
means of entrants’ incomes and universe A increasingly diverge with the 
former being greater (see t-values in Table 1).
16  
 
We conclude that the less demanding our definition of democracy 
the more likely is the Przeworski hypothesis to be accepted. But for the 
more demanding definitions of democracy income level seems to play a 
significant role. The draws into democracy are no longer purely random—
viz. they are associated with higher income.  
 
                                                 
16 The same results are obtained using probit regressions for the entry into democracy. 
Income has no statistically significant effect (at 1 percent level) until polity2 values 
reaches 7 after which it is very strongly and positively associated with the probability of 
entry into democracy (see Annex 2 top table).  17 
 
Figure 4.  Distributions of entry-incomes and the relevant universe of 
country-incomes A (using different definitions of democracy) 
 
    Polity2>1                                                     Polity2>3 
 
 
        Polity2>5                                                            P olity2>8 
Note: Universe incomes = solid line. Entry incomes = dashed line. All incomes are in 
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Table 1. Kolmogorov-Sminov (KS) and means tests of equality of two 
income distributions : incomes of countries that entered democracy and 





Hypothesis of equality of 
distributions 
Hypothesis of equality of 
the means 1/ 


















1  0.129*  0.038  0.795  0.213  118  1701 
2  0.134*  0.036  1.255  0.105  112  1772 
3  0.126  0.057  1.612  0.054  110  1893 
4  0.136*  0.035  1.696*  0.045  108  2061 
5  0.175**  0.004  2.262*  0.012  99  2231 
6  0.200**  0.001  2.543**  0.005  90  2317 
7  0.239**  0.000  2.644**  0.004  73  2906 
8  0.323**  0.000  3.595**  0.000  51  2486 
9  0.331**  0.001  3.299**  0.000  33  1395 
1/ Tested versus the alternative that the mean income of the entries is higher (hence 
income plays a role).  
2/ Universe A is composed of all country incomes in the years when there were entries 
into  democracy  (weighted  by  the  number  of  entries  and  adjusted  for  countries  that  
already are democracies). 
Note: One (two) asterisks indicate significance level less than 5 (1) percent. 
  19 
Second test: entrants’ incomes against income of potential entrants 
with the same previously achieved level of democracy 
 
Yet the following argument could  be made in defense of the 
Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis. Suppose that entries into democracy 
depend also on the previously achieved level of democracy as expressed 
in equation (2).  
 
) ( Pr ) , | ( Pr 1 , it t h t it D ob D y D ob = −        ( 2 )  
 
where probability of entry into democracy of level i at time t is 
viewed as  conditional not only on income but on the previously achieved 
level of democracy Dh,t-1 (h<i). 
17 The universe of incomes with which we 
are concerned now is not composed of all country-incomes at a given 
year but only of incomes of countries whose previously achieved level of 
democracy is the same as the previously achieved level of democracy of 
the new entrants. We call this universe B. If a given country enters 
democracy in year t, its income should not be—according to this 
argument—contrasted with incomes of all countries which in year t could 
have entered democracy but only with incomes of a subset of countries 
that had the same level of democracy as the entrant country. In this case, 
the probability of entry into democracy may be independent of income but 
may depend on the previous level of democracy (Dt-1).  
 
We test this hypothesis next. The entrants into democracy (for each 
level of polity2) remain the same as before, but the universe with which to 
                                                 
17 Previously achieved level of democracy is technically the same thing as one-period 
lagged democracy. We prefer the former term because it conveys more exactly from 
what point do countries move (or fail to move) to higher levels of democracy.   20 
compare their distribution changes. As an illustration, compare the 
distribution of entry incomes when democracy is defined as polity2>8 with  
the universes A and B. In Figure 5a (left panel), the comparator is the 
universe of all country-incomes, i.e.,  the universe A, while in Figure 5b 
(right panel)  the comparator is the more restricted universe B. It is clear 
that while the two distributions are visually different in Figure 5a, the 
differences are much less in Figure 5b. In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
hypothesis of equality of the two distributions is rejected in the former 
and accepted in the latter case. 
 
Table 2 shows that the new universe of incomes B and incomes of 
entrants into democracy are not statistically different whether we use 
non-parametric or parametric testing (except in out of ten cases for each 
test, and this rather marginally at barely less than 5 percent). The 
relationship (2) is therefore accepted almost throughout, that is for all 
levels of democracy. 
18 
                                                 
18 It is also confirmed by the probit regressions shown in Annex 2 (table on the bottom). 
The income coefficient is statistically insignificant throughout.   21 
Figure 5. Distribution of entry incomes vs. two alternative 
definitions of the universe of country incomes 
(democracy level: polity2>8) 
 
(a) universe A: all country incomes  (b) universe B: country 
incomes with the same 
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Note: all country incomes in logs. Entry incomes: broken line  Universes A and B: 
solid line. 
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Table 2. Kolmogorov-Sminov (KS) and means tests of equality of two 
income distributions : incomes of countries that entered democracy and 





Hypothesis of equality of 
distributions 
Hypothesis of equality of 
the means 1/ 


















1  0.12  0.13  0.58  0.28  118  291 
2  0.15  0.052  1.11  0.13  111  298 
3  0.15  0.054  1.19  0.12  109  285 
4  0.12  0.16  1.12  0.13  108  298 
5  0.13  0.12  1.78*  0.04  99  319 
6  0.14  0.10  0.85  0.20  89  329 
7  0.17*  0.045  1.54  0.06  72  301 
8  0.12  0.51  0.80  0.21  49  215 
9  0.22  0.14  -1.29  0.90  31  97 
1/ Tested versus the alternative that the mean income of the entries is higher (hence 
income plays a role).   
2/ Universe B is composed of incomes of all countries that had the same previous (past 
year’s) level of democracy as the new entrants into democracy. 
Note: One (two) asterisks indicate significance level less than 5 (1) percent. 
 
 
We conclude that if we control for the already achieved level of 
democracy, incomes of  entrants into a higher level of democracy do not 
display either a statistically different distribution or the mean from the 
incomes of the countries who do not move to a higher level of democracy. 
Consequently, conditional on the previously attained level of democracy, 
income does not seem to play a role in making countries more or less 
likely to accede to a higher level of democracy. We can write it more 
formally: 
  23 
Proposition 1. Countries that enter into higher levels of democracy 
are not a random draw from the universe of all country incomes; but 
countries that enter higher levels of democracy are a random draw from 
the joint distribution of previous level of democracy and  income.  
 
A reconciliation and a different hypothesis 
How do we explain Proposition 1? Consider  the following story. 
Suppose that at some initial point in time all countries have the same low 
income, and that in terms of democracy they are randomly distributed 
reflecting a contingent nature of creation of democratic institutions as 
argued by Przeworski and Limongi. Let their growth be random with 
respect to democracy but such that  Alpha countries do not grow at all and  
Beta countries do (at uneven rates). Assume further that Alpha’s levels of 
democracy and of course income remain the same throughout time while—
crucially—the draws into higher democracy are made only from among the 
Beta countries. At each period, as Betas grow, some of them, will 
randomly (that is, independently of their income) accede to higher 
democracy levels and others will  not. Our universe B will be composed of 
Beta countries only and the draws out of that universe will be random with 
respect to income. However, the universe A is composed both of 
stationary Alphas and  the (unequally growing) Betas. The distribution of 
entrants’ incomes will, when compared with the universe A, tend to be 
skewed to the right (toward richer countries) while, of course, it will be 
the same as the distribution of universe B. We obtain the results identical 
to what we have found here. The key factor is that entries into higher 
democracy are made from the growing countries only, but once the 
countries are growing the draws are indeed random.  
  24 
This explanation is illustrated in Figure 6. The draws into higher 
levels of democracy are made solely from Universe B (from two different 
levels of democracy d1 and d2; see the shaded areas). The draws are 
income-random, and thus  the distribution of income among the entrants 
into democracy d3 (d3>d2> and d3>d1) is not statistically different from the  
distribution of incomes in the universe B. But the distribution of entrants’ 
incomes is different (skewed toward higher income countries) from the 
distribution of incomes in the universe A. This is possible only because 
incomes in the “excluded” area (universe A exclusive of universe B, that 
is, A~B) are systematically lower than incomes in the B areas.  
 
To summarize, we deal with three kinds of countries: 
(i)  entrants into democracy 
(ii)  countries that did not enter democracy but had the same 
Dt-1 as those that did (universe B) 
(iii)  countries that did not enter democracy and did not have 
the same Dt-1 as any of the countries that entered 
democracy. They are the “excluded” countries.   25 
Figure 6. Entrants into higher level of democracy and 
the two universes of income 




We move now to the study of this hypothesis. First, we confirm that 
the “excluded” countries have lower income on average and different 
distribution (skewed to the left) than the entrants into democracy or 
universe B. 
19 However is their prior democratic achievement (Dt-1) lower 
too? We do not know that because countries acceding to higher levels of 
democracy could have had come from relatively high or relatively low 
democracy countries.   To see how this is possible, look at the universe B  
when democracy is defined to be higher than polity2 value of d3 (Figure 
6). Countries from which the new entrants into d3 were recruited had 
previously achieved democracy levels of d1 and d2. But we do not know if 
these levels were relatively high or low, and correspondingly if the 
                                                 
19 We check that using the same tests of distributions and the means as before. We find 
that the hypothesis of the equality of incomes between the “excluded” country/years and 
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“excluded” countries had, on average, democracy levels that were greater 
or lower than d1 or d2. 
20 We study this in Table 3 which compares  
democracy levels of “excluded” countries and universe B. The 
interpretation of the results as follows. Consider democracy to be polity2 
>1. In the years where there were draws into  democracy, let the entrants’ 
previously achieved  levels of democracy by be x, y and z. All countries 
(whether they entered or not democracy) with such levels are part of 
universe B. On average, the universe B was characterized by Dt-1 equal to 
-2.9 (Table 3). How about the excluded countries? They were, on 
average, significantly less democratic than the universe B countries. Their 
mean Dt-1 was -6.29 (and different from -2.9 at less than 0.1 percent 
level of significance). The difference between the two means steadily 
increases as we raise the bar for our definition of democracy. For 
example, when democracy is defined as polity2>8, the universe B was 
composed of countries with the previous (past year’s) average democracy 
score of 5. The excluded countries’ average score was only -2.7.  
                                                 
20 We know that they could not have had levels d1 or d2 since  they would not be 
“excluded” then.  27 
Table 3. Test of equality of previously achieved democracy (Dt-1) 






level of democracy 
(mean) 
Hypothesis of equality of 
the means 1/ 





Universe B  “Excluded”
countries 
t-value  p-value of 
the test 
Universe B  “Excluded” 
Countries 
1  -2.90  -6.21  12.46**  0.000  290  1582 
2  -2.47  -5.95  12.50**  0.000  297  1677 
3  -2.31  -5.75  12.38**  0.000  284  1783 
4  -2.05  -5.45  12.32**  0.000  297  1954 
5  -1.53  -5.01  10.65**  0.000  319  2110 
6  0.07  -4.45  13.88**  0.000  329  2162 
7  1.48  -4.17  15.89**  0.000  301  2768 
8  5.01  -2.72  18.83**  0.000  215  2382 
9  8.56  -1.46  17.18**  0.000  97  1378 
1/ Tested versus the alternative that the mean income of the two groups is the same.  
Note: One (two) asterisks indicate significance level less than 5 (1) percent. 
 
The results are the same if we use non-parametric testing. Figure 7 
illustrates the big difference in the achieved democracy levels prior to the 
accession to two different levels of democracy. For example, if  
democracy=polity2>5, most of the entrants had prior democracy scores of 
5 or just under 5. But more than eighty percent of the excluded countries 
had previous democracy levels below zero with the mode being -8 and the 
median -7. 
21 
                                                 
21 There are a few apparently odd cases of excluded countries with Dt-1 greater than 5. 
This happens as follow. A country in year t-1 may have democracy level of 7. In year t, 
it drops to (say) 4. There is a democracy draw in year t  but none from countries with 
democracy level of 4. Then the country is treated as excluded even if its previous year’s 
democracy was higher than 5. One such example is Bangladesh in 1961. In 1960, its 
democracy score was 8, in 1961 after the coup it became -7. It was an excluded country 
in 1961. (The same logic applies when democracy is defined as polity2>8).   28 
Figure 7. Distribution of the previously achieved level of democracy (Dt-1) 
of entrants and excluded countries 
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Note: entrants, broken line; excluded countries, solid line. 
 
We conclude that the “excluded” countries are  both poorer on 
average and with significantly lower past achievement of democracy that 
the universe B  countries, that is, the  countries from among whom the 
recruitment into democracy is made.  
 
Which are the excluded countries? This would of course vary with 
our definition of democracy.
  As an example consider polity2>5 to be the 
definition of democracy, and limit the data to the period after 1950. 
Between 1950 and 2002, there were 71 entries into democracy. They took  29 
place in thirty years (i.e. there was positive draws in thirty out of fifty-
three years). In most of these years only 1 new country entered, but in 
1990 five and in 1991 eleven did. Consider for example year 1990. Five 
countries that acceded were Hungary (with Dt-1 =4), Nicaragua (Dt-1 =-1), 
Haiti (Dt-1=-6), Bulgaria (with Dt-1=-7), and Namibia (missing value for  
Dt-1). To be  excluded means that country’s Dt-1  was different from  these 
four values. Now, if this happens repeatedly (in all years when there are 
draws into democracy), the implication is that the excluded country is 
sufficiently different from the democratic entrants that it is unlikely ever 
to be ‘drafted” into democracy. Again, taking polity2>5 as our definition of 
democracy, consider the list of countries that have been excluded in more 
than 25 out of 30 years when there were draws into democracy (over the 
period 1950-2002).
22 The list is given in Table 4. Several of them 
(Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia) were excluded from all thirty 
draws. They never came  close to being recruitment candidates for 
democracy.  
                                                 
22 We can visualize entries into democracy as annual lotteries. Suppose that black men, 
black women, white men, and white women participate. In some years, no one wins the 
prize, in other years, some members from two groups (say, black women and white men) 
win. To be excluded in one year means that no one from a given group (say, black men) 
has won. But if this continues year after year, that group (black men) will indeed feel 
quite excluded. If one is a black men, he would feel excluded not solely because he has 
failed to win (many people did) but because no one from your group ever did.  
  30 
Table 4. List of the most frequently excluded countries when 
“draws “ into democracy (defined as polity2>5) were made, 
period  1950-2002 
 
  Number of 
exclusions 




Morocco  26  2782  -6 
Guatemala  26  3363  8 
Liberia  27  846  0 
Indonesia  27  3256  7 
Iran  28  4911  3 
Ethiopia 1/  28  660  n.a. 
Albania  28  2807  5 
Iraq  29  1294  -9 
Egypt  29  2992  -6 
Cuba  29  2477  -7 
China  29  3583  -7 
Libya  29  2284  -7 
North Korea  29  1154  -9 
Saudi Arabia  30  8015  -10 
Jordan  30  4055  -2 
Oman  30  6926  -9 
Afghanistan  30  453  n.a. 
1/ Inclusive of Eritrea before the separation. 
 
  As we can see, these are generally poor countries (with the 
exception of two oil-rich kingdoms) with low democracy scores. The 
unweighted 2001 mean GDI per capita for this group is $PPP 3,050 which 
is less than half of world average in the same year, and their mean polity2 
value is -3.1 compared to the world average of 3. However, being  
excluded is not an immutable fate as we can see from the examples of 
Guatemala and Indonesia which respectively in 1998 and 1999 acceded to 
democracy.   31 
5. Conclusions 
 
The objective was to investigate the effects of income (and 
implicitly income growth) on accession to democracy. The paper uses two  
long-term data series which have only recently become available and 
combines them in a new fashion. It also departs from some other tests 
done previously because it emphasizes non-parametric testing. 
 
First, the paper rejects the dyadic view of democracy vs. non-
democracy. We do not start with an a priori definition of democracy, but 
rather study how entries into democracy systematically vary with the 
changing definition of what democracy is. It then emerges that our view as 
to whether higher income encourages emergence of democracy or not 
depends on what our definition of  democracy is. If that definition is 
relatively broad, we find that the entrants into democracy do not, on 
average, have significantly higher incomes than those that do not enter 
democracy. However if the definition of democracy is more demanding 
(narrow), we conclude that the distribution and the mean values of 
entrants’ incomes are respectively different (more skewed to the right) 
and higher than those of the countries that fail to democratize. The 
monotonic relationship between the increase in the level of democracy 
and rejection of the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis is quite unambiguous. 
 
However, if in addition to a simple probability of entry into 
democracy conditional on income, we posit that the entry is conditional 
also on the previously achieved level of democracy, we find that income 
no longer plays a role in the selection of countries that enter democracy. 
This holds for practically all levels of democracies. In other words. the  32 
role of income in “helping” entry into democracy seems to vanish once we 
control for the previously achieved level of democracy.  
 
How do we reconcile these two different findings?  We argue that 
the results imply that there is a subgroup of “excluded” countries that 
exhibit both low levels of income and democracy. They are defined not 
simply by the fact that they have failed to enter democracy (defined as, 
say, polity2 value of 5 or 6 or 7), but that no country with their level of 
democratic achievement has succeeded in acceding to polity2>5 or 
polity2>6 etc. In other words, these countries are significantly different 
from the set of countries from which the recruitment into democracy is 
made. Obviously, a country need not be “excluded” throughout all the 
years. In some years, another country with the same low level of previous 
democratic achievement can accede to democracy. But this is unusual.  
 
Now, from the other group of countries from which the draws into 
democracy are made, the entries into democracy are income-random.  
There is thus a major discontinuity or the split in the sample. Income both 
matters and does not matter. It matters because low income is probably 
the reason why the “excluded countries” are unable to improve their 
democracy levels and move to a group of countries wherefrom the 
recruitment into democracy is made. But, on the other hand,  income does 
not matter for other countries’ accession to higher democracy levels since 
the accession occurs randomly.   
 
  33 
Annex 1. Year and GDI per capita when country entered democracy 
(democracy defined as polity2>5) 
Country  Entry GDI per capita  Year of entry    Country  Entry GDI per capita Year of entry 
Burma 396 1950 Singapore 2186 1959
Botswana 473 1966 New  Zeal.  2212 1860
Niger 509 1992 Canada  2249 1888
Malawi 522 1994 Japan  2336 1952
Bangladesh 526 1959 Serbia/Montenegro  2354 2000
Lesotho 577 1966 Bolivia  2394 1982
India 619 1950 Colombia  2400 1957
Pakistan 638 1956 Austria  2412 1920
Laos 661 1957 Ireland  2533 1921
Uganda 694 1962 Jamaica  2541 1959
Madagascar 715 1992 Germany  2586 1919
Mali 758 1992 Israel  2817 1950
Zambia 797 1991 Mauritius  2907 1968
Gambia 846 1965 Italy  2920 1947
Nigeria 854 1960 Sweden  3048 1914
S.Leone 858 1961 Indonesia  3107 1999
Greece 880 1870 Guatemala 3232 1996
Sudan 889 1954 Paraguay  3237 1992
Nepal 961 1999 Namibia  3278 1990
Haiti 1041 1990 Romania  3307 1996
Mongolia 1049 1992 Syria  3453 1954
Mozambique 1084 1994 Ukraine  3477 1880
S. Korea  1105 1960 Moldova  3519 1993
Sri Lanka  1159 1948 Netherlands  3627 1917
Benin 1162 1991 Macedonia 3644 1991
Ghana 1210 1979 S.  Africa  3698 1992
Portugal 1242 1911 Australia  3839 1901
USA 1257 1820 Denmark  3857 1911
Somalia 1277 1960 Ecuador  4060 1979
Turkey 1430 1946 Peru  4205 1980
Senegal 1433 2000 Panama  4361 1989
Dom. Rep.  1437 1963 Chile  4693 1964
Nicaragua 1454 1990 Poland  4738 1991
Malaysia 1455 1957 Uruguay  4957 1952
Switzerland 1488 1850 Thailand  5290 1992
Brazil 1501 1946 Armenia  5297 1991
France 1529 1848 Ukraine  5485 1991
Finland 1581 1917 Bulgaria  5597 1990
Costa Rica  1624 1920 Slovakia  5907 1993
Spain 1786 1900 Russia  6293 1992
Honduras 1833 1982 Hungary  6459 1990
Norway 1900 1898 Trinidad/Tob 6514 1962
Belgium 1962 1853 Mexico  6541 1997
Philippines 2040 1987 Croatia  6632 2000
El Salvador  2091 1984 Belarus  7076 1991
 Czech  7819 1993
 Argentina  7962 1973 34 
 Lithuania  8139 1991
 Latvia  8888 1991
 Estonia  9744 1991
 Venezuela  9816 1958
 Slovenia  10402 1991
 Taiwan  11128 1992
 
Note: Countries ranked by their entry income. Democracy defined as polity2 value greater than 5. The year 
is the first year when country  reached such level of democracy.   35 
Year and GDI per capita when country entered democracy 
(democracy defined as polity2>8) 
 
Country  Entry GDI per capita  Year of entry 
Lesotho 577  1966 
India 619  1950 
Madagascar 715  1992 
Greece 880  1870 
Mongolia 1049  1992 
United States  1257  1820 
Malaysia 1455  1957 
Switzerand 1488  1850 
Costa Rica  1624  1920 
Finland 1658  1919 
Norway 1900  1898 
Austria 1956  1946 
Bolivia 2181  1985 
New Zeal  2212  1860 
Turkey 2221  1961 
Canada 2249  1888 
Japan 2336  1952 
Jamaica 2541  1959 
Ireland 2653  1927 
France 2811  1919 
Israel 2817  1950 
Mauritius 2907  1968 
Sweden 2968  1916 
Italy 3063  1948 
Germany 3282  1949 
Belgium 3389  1919 
Netherlands 3627  1917 
Peru 3630  2001 
Botswana 3659  1997 
South Africa  3755  1994 
Australia 3839  1901 
Ecuador 4060  1979 
Denmark 4110  1914 
United Kingdom  4637  1922 
Colombia 4821  1991 
Thailand 5290  1992 
Panama 5329  1994 
Uruguay 5567  1985 
Poland 5623  1995 
Bulgaria 5644  2001 
Hungary 6459  1990 
Portugal 6814  1976 
Slovakia 7592  1998 
Czech 7819  1993 
Lithuania 8139  1991 
Spain 9023  1978  36 
Chile 9841  2000 
Venezuela 10262  1969 
Slovenia 10402  1991 
Trinidad and Tobago  11273  1984 
Taiwan 14598  1997 
 
Note: Countries ranked by their entry income. Democracy defined as polity2 value greater than 8. The year 
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